This is Part III of a three-part series reviewing the future of Africa’s electoral landscape. Today’s contribution looks towards elections in 2019 as the political landscapes in two of Africa’s biggest countries sit on a knife edge, amid allegations of corruption and broken promises.
This is Part II of a three-part series reviewing the future of Africa’s electoral landscape. Today’s contribution assesse elections that are scheduled over the coming 12 months – outlining potential outcomes, the key political players, and the methods through which incumbents will attempt to retain power in the face of increasing competition from strengthening opposition groups.
Free Article
This is Part I of a three-part series reviewing the future of Africa’s electoral landscape. Today’s contribution reviews the upcoming elections in the DRC and South Sudan – both have been subjected to various delays as their respective leaders attempt to legitimise their extended stays in power – as well as the aftermaths of various recent elections that are still playing out.
Over the last decade, wealthy Angolans have increasingly invested their wealth in lucrative sectors of Portugal’s economy. Despite its less than lucrative nature, the Portuguese media sector has not escaped Angolan interest. Largely targeted by individuals with close ties to the MPLA – investing in Portugal’s media sector has gained Luanda huge influence.
The escalation in violence in the DRC has forced Angola – traditionally one of the DRC’s staunchest allies – to scale back its support for its neighbour as the crisis begins to threaten Angola’s own security environment, particularly that of its oil-rich Cabinda province.
China’s use of soft power in Africa has served to strengthen relations with individual countries and the region as a whole. Yet, despite the initial altruistic appearance of many of Beijing’s Africa initiatives, China’s involvement in the African market does not necessarily bode well for the future of transparency.
Over the past decade China’s relationship with Africa has become much more complex, and can no longer be defined by the simple need to secure access to natural resources. Ultimately, Beijing’s engagement with Africa is believed to be a part of a long-term strategy to restore China to global prominence.
As Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari’s anti-corruption efforts continue to stall, concerns are increasing that his war against corruption has been reduced to a thinly veiled excuse to target members of the political opposition. To maintain the credibility of his public stance against corruption, Buhari cannot afford to spare corruption within his own administration.
Sonangol’s complex relationship with the Presidential office has created a de facto parallel government. Over the years it has operated outwith the traditional remit of a national oil company, exercising undue political and economic influence to the benefit of a select few. However, a combination of low global oil prices and restructuring will likely serve to finally curb its influence.
Depending on which stance is adopted, Egypt and Sudan are simultaneously the best of friends and the worst of enemies. It is no secret that these countries have their differences, with notable issues playing out publically. However, there is much that binds these two African nations and the recent friction must be understood in context, to gain a deeper understanding of the impact this may have on investments.
Sinopec’s acquisition of Chevron’s downstream businesses in South Africa and Botswana is China’s first major investment into Africa’s downstream oil industry. With energy demand in Africa continuing to increase – and demand slowing in China – Chinese companies are consequently turning to foreign markets to secure further customers for continued growth. Conversely, these investments may merely be part of a wider politically-motivated plan aimed at promoting China’s political influence across, not only Africa, but the wider international community.
Navigating the mining sector in the DRC remains a hazardous and sometimes complex prospect – depending on location and context, either political elite networks or armed groups have developed a monopoly over this lucrative sector.